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Recent conflict between indigenous people and a self-styled indigenous state in Bolivia 
has brought to the fore some of the paradoxes and contradictions within the concept 
of indigeneity itself. The contemporary politics of state sponsored indigeneity in Bolivia 
has as much capacity to create new inequalities as it does to address old ones and 
there is a conceptual deficit in understanding contemporary indigenous rights claims, 
in particular, as they relate to the state. I reject Peter Geschiere’s (2009) suggestion 
that one should distinguish between ‘autochthony’ and ‘indigeneity’ but am inspired 
by these arguments to suggest that one needs to make a critical distinction between 
the kinds of claims different indigenous people make against the state. Of interest 
here are the consequences of indigeneity being transformed from being a language of 
resistance to a language of governance. I propose a conceptual distinction between 
inclusive national indigeneity for the majority which seeks to co-opt the state through 
accessing the language of governance and a minority concept of indigeneity which 
needs protection from the state and continues to use indigeneity as a language of 
resistance. Only by looking at the kinds of claims people make through the rhetoric 
of indigeneity can we make sense of the current indigenous conflict in Bolivia and 
elsewhere. 
Keywords: Indigeneity | The State | Justice
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1. Introduction
In July, 2011, a group of indigenous people representing the ethnic groups of the 
Tsimanes, Moxetenes and Yuracarés left TIPNIS, the Territorio Indígena Parque 
Nacional Isiboro Securé with the intention of marching to the capital city of La Paz 
in order to protest the construction of a road across their territory. On the 25th of 
September, the marchers were prevented from continuing by police on the grounds 
that they could not guarantee their safety from groups protesting in favor of the road 
and a violent confrontation ensued. Such a march and protest has become almost 
commonplace in Latin American countries in recent decades as national governments 
continue to build to roads and drill for oil in indigenous territories. What is surprising in 
this case is that this occurred in a state which is led by an indigenous president who 
has placed indigeneity at the very center of how he expresses the legitimacy of his rule 
and has explicitly created a series of very public rituals to match his rhetoric of having 
created an indigenous state. His administration introduced a new national constitution 
giving rights to recognized indigenous communities to manage their own resources 
and the right to be consulted in areas of development. The confusion is compounded 
by the fact that those marching in favor of the road were indigenous coca growers and 
staunch supporters of the President.
In this paper I would like to discuss some of the contradictions at the heart of the new 
indigenous state in Bolivia. The broader issues, however, relate to our understanding of 
indigeneity, about its weakness as an anthropological concept as well as a weakness 
in international law and the way it is understood by the United Nations (UN) and 
multilateral agencies. Indigeneity may be a useful conceptual tool for understanding 
conflicts between indigenous people and nation-states where indigenous groups are 
powerless minorities; they are, I argue, woefully inadequate in understanding conflict 
between different groups of indigenous people within a nation state, much less between 
indigenous people and an indigenous state.
First we need to tackle the thorny problem of what indigenous people are and as 
many scholars have noted it is very difficult to avoid falling into an essentialist trap 
(Barnard 2006; Bowen 2000; Gausset et al. 2011; Kenrick and Lewis 2004; Kuper 
2003a; Paradies 2006; Ramos 2003; Saugestad 2004; Warren and Jackson 2002). 
Adam Kuper some years ago sparked a controversy over the anthropological use of the 
term ‘indigenous people’ (Kuper 2003a; 2003b; 2005) which has occasioned numerous 
responses to his original Current Anthropology article within the pages of that journal 
(Current Anthropology 45, 2, 2004, and 47, 1, 2006) as well as some others (Kenrick 
and Lewis 2004, Barnard 2006). Much of Kuper’s initial paper and a large proportion of 
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the responses concern themselves with Central and Southern Africa and, in particular, 
the way in which ‘indigenous people’ refers to hunter gatherers. As a consequence 
much of the thrust of his argument and the numerous rejoinders are largely irrelevant 
to Latin American concerns.1 Kuper is, however, surely right in pointing out that there 
is an arbitrariness in distinguishing between one set of marginal peasants and another 
on the basis of some putative condition of indigeneity or marginal lifestyle in the past 
and echoes a set of concerns raised by others such as John Gledhill (1999) and André 
Béteille (1998).
There are many peoples in Latin America who readily conform to the broad description 
of those described by Kenrick and Lewis (2004) in their rejoinder to Kuper in that 
they are small groups marginalized by the state who are not or were not historically, 
settled farmers; and indeed some contemporary lowland groups are sometimes 
described as ‘living in the stone age’.2 This does not, however, describe the many 
millions of people who are farmers – and whose ancestors have a long history (at 
least five millennia)3 of farming – who are identified as indigenous, nor the possibly 
greater millions of people who are urban and also identify as indigenous. It seems at 
least curious that the ‘indigenous peoples debate’ which revolves around a criticism 
and defense of organizing around the term ‘indigenous people’ should so ignore the 
most successful examples of such organization. Furthermore, although it may appear 
‘relatively easy’ to say who is indigenous in Latin America, as is sometimes suggested 
(Barnard 2006: 8; Kenrick and Lewis 2004: 6), who is and who isn’t indigenous and 
what it means to be indigenous in Latin America is highly variable, context- specific 
and changes over time (e.g. Cadena 2000; Canessa 2006; Harris et al. 1995; Martínez 
Novo 2006). In fact, many of the more same issues that face scholars of indigeneity 
in Africa (e.g. Hodgson 2011; Lee 2003; Wilmsen 1989) and Asia (e.g. Li 2000; Shah 
2010; Tsing 2004), such as the role of the state in constructing indigeneity, the problems 
of homogenizing indigenous identity, and the apparent arbitrariness in the ways some 
people are included and others excluded, can easily be reproduced in Latin America.
In an earlier work (2007) I suggested that the best way to understand indigeneity 
was in terms of a ‘claim to justice’, one based on awareness of historical injustice 
the consequences of which have been inherited by contemporary people. This way 
of understanding indigeneity fits in well with the growing understanding of indigeneity 
1 Kuper mentions the large and successful indigenous movements of Latin America only once in his 
original paper (2003a: 391) and then only in the most tangential way.
2 Alcida Ramos (2003: 397-8), one of the few Latin Americanists to comment on Kuper’s paper directs 
her discussion to Amazonian examples.
3 That is, sedenterization was developing in the Andean about a thousand years before it was in 
Britain. Victorian evolutionists had a much more recent hunter-gather ancestry than native Andeans.
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as a globalized discourse of rights which are accessed by peoples engaged in local 
struggles. Anna Tsing suggests that indigeneity is a ‘universal’ concept, one which 
has the ability to spread across cultures and engage with large numbers of different 
people. These universals cause ‘frictions’ (Tsing 2004) as they travel, producing new 
relations, new alliances and new ideas. There is an inherent instability to these travelling 
universals and the frictions they produce (Tsing 2004: 1-13) and it is such a friction that 
is producing multiple ways of understanding indigeneity in contemporary Bolivia which 
often appear at loggerheads with each other.
There can be no doubt that discourses of indigeneity can be very enabling for 
marginalized peoples who otherwise would not have access to international courts 
and global mobilizations of interest groups or what Tania Murray Li (2000) has called 
the ‘indigenous people’s slot’. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have had 
a considerable role in creating such alliances and developing politically engaged 
discourses of indigeneity as otherwise disempowered groups make claims to justice 
against, typically, the states in which they find themselves (Escárcega 2010; Greene 
2009; Hathaway 2010; Li 2000; Martínez Novo 2006; Sapignoli 2012; Sieder 2002) 
and, as such, indigenous movements are often seen as essentially progressive. 
Nevertheless the impulse to be strategically essentialist (Spivak 1988) is sometimes 
difficult to resist when such a discourse is required by international funding agencies 
(Laurie et al. 2002) or by the very nature of national political discourses (Canessa 2007; 
Wade 1997). Indigenous groups may find it irresistible to meet outsiders’ expectations 
about a primordial and mystical relation to the land or a highly essentialized view of 
culture when to do so may open up the only political space to discuss land rights, 
autonomy and so on. These discourses may not only misrepresent the actual views and 
practices of people but may arbitrarily create divisions between people. A number of 
anthropologists, particularly those working in Africa and India (Kuper 2005, Geschiere 
2009, Karlson 2003, Shah 2010) have noted that filling the ‘indigenous slot’ is not always 
conducive to progressive politics and, moreover, may actually harm the interests of the 
people they are supposed to serve.
There is an inherent tension between the universality of indigeneity as a powerful 
and enabling globalized context and the fact that the discourse of indigeneity is one 
that lays claim to a cultural and temporal specificity: it always argues for a particular 
status for those attached to a particular place since a particular time. The attachment 
to ultimately arbitrary axes of space and time almost inevitably lead to essentialist 
discourses to account for why one people should have rights over a particular territory 
on the ground that they have occupied it since a particular date. These frictions and 
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tensions are not only creating new hierarchies between indigenous people but they are 
exposing contradictions at the heart of the nation-state and conflict between people 
who one might otherwise expect to be in alliance.
At root is the question: are indigenous people all the descendants of those who lived 
within the current nation-state boundaries at the time of colonization or are they those 
who define their attachment to a much smaller territory occupied in a more recent 
historical period? Under current international law, e.g. International Labor Organization 
Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, and the practice of international 
agencies (World Bank and the UN), indigeneity is explicitly defined in terms of self-
identification, independent nation states, and occupation since the time of colonization. 
These issues may not matter very much when we are talking about the efforts of a 
cultural distinct people who speak an indigenous language, occupy a clearly defined 
territory and are in a struggle against a state controlled by people of European descent. 
They become quite important, however, when indigenous people are arguably the 
majority of the population and the faces in the cabinet, including the President’s, 
are indigenous; they begin to matter even more when the state styles itself as being 
‘indigenous’.
2. Evo Morales and the Indigenous State
There can be little doubt that Bolivia is an exemplary example of what has been described 
as indigenous awakening (Albó 1991; Bengoa 2000; Brysk 2000; Stavenhagen 2002; 
Wearne 1996) in Latin America and that Evo Morales’ winning of the 2005 presidential 
election is both a product of this ‘indigenous awakening’ and a contributory factor in setting 
social and political conditions for an indigenous identity to be increasingly acceptable. 
It is important to note, however, that even though mobilization by indigenous people 
increased following neoliberal reforms in the 1990s many of these people mobilizing 
were not doing so as indigenous people per se but, rather, as Bolivian citizens who 
happened to be indigenous. This is the central argument of Nancy Postero who suggests 
that the neoliberal reforms had the largely unintended effect of creating a new sense of 
citizens’ entitlement and struggle:
[I]t is clear that even though the faces on the frontlines of the demonstrations 
were overwhelmingly Indian […], ‘The Bolivian people’ [which the marchers 
claimed to represent] did not signify indigenous – or more specifically, it did not 
only signify indigenous. (Postero 2007: 221) 
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This is an important point because it marks a significant shift in indigenous people being 
on the margins of the nation state and, at best, represented by mestizos and creoles to a 
growing position where they were considered best able to defend the national patrimony. 
This shift was shrewdly manipulated by Evo Morales who in about 2002 started to adopt 
an indigenous rhetoric positioning indigenous people as the moral guardians of the nation 
state, best able to defend its natural resources. 
The ‘indigenous awakening’ can be dated from the 1990 march from the Lowlands to the 
Highlands for ‘Territory and Dignity’ (marcha por el territorio y la dignidad), but the alliance 
between highlanders and lowlanders did not prove to be sustainable and thenceforth 
the thrust of indigenous mobilization was more securely located in the highlands which 
progressively moved to articulate broader national rather than particularistic indigenous 
concerns. Unlike lowlanders, highlanders have a long history of settled agriculture and 
state politics. These Aymara and Quechua speaking people make up almost half, perhaps 
more, of the population of the country. They have long resided in the historically more 
populous western mountains but in recent years have been moving east in search of 
new economic opportunities. It is these people who constitute the bedrock of support for 
the current administration. As Nancy Postero and Leon Zamosc (2004: 26) point out 
‘demographics is a critical factor in shaping the demands of indigenous people’ and it 
should not therefore be surprising that highlanders and lowlanders have very different 
demands vis à vis the state (see also Urban and Scherzer 1991). 
To what extent can Bolivia be described as an indigenous state? It is formally a 
multicultural and plurinational state but the new constitution privileges certain indigenous 
citizens over others, in particular the kind of citizen described in the constitution as 
‘originary peasant indigenous’ (sic). I will come back to this citizen in a moment but first 
I want to outline the ways in which the Morales government has placed indigeneity at 
the very center of the way in which it presents itself to its citizens.
The first and most obvious way was the way in which Morales downplayed the 
constitutional inauguration ceremony for an indigenous ceremony in the country’s 
premier archaeological site, Tiwanaku. Morales made explicit that his legitimacy 
derived from the authority of the indigenous people and cultures he represented. 
Accompanied by four amautas, wise men, he walked to the four cardinal points of the 
Akapana pyramid and received the staff of office and offerings from the peoples of 
Abya Yala, an indigenous term for America, from representatives of indigenous people 
from Patagonia to Canada. In his speech he condemned: 
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[T[]he State which is now going, the State which now dies. A colonial State 
which permitted the permanent sacking of natural resources from this noble 
earth, a colonial disciplining State, a colonial State which has always seen us, 
the indigenous people of the world, as savages, as animals. I don’t know how 
much we will change but we need to change, because the colonial State brings 
no hope for the peoples of the world.4 
And so among his first moves, he abolished the Department of Indigenous affairs 
because from now on all national affairs were indigenous. But in Tiwanaku, he also 
directed his rhetoric against a world capitalist system and raised the banner of struggle 
in defense of the earth and humanity against capitalism: ‘The peoples of the world 
on their feet, not kneeling before capitalism. This is an historic battle, a millenarian 
battle of our ancestors’;5 he further outlined his ideas of ‘living well’ or buen vivir in 
which communitarian, indigenous values were raised about the capitalist imperative 
of extraction and growth. In Tiwanaku he outlined the values of buen vivir as follows: 
To live well means to live in harmony with everyone and everything, between 
humans and our Mother Earth; and it consequently implies working for the 
dignity of all. And nowadays it is more important than ever to know how to 
share, to know how to distribute wealth equitably. What belongs to the people is 
for the people. To democratize the economy. That is why we nationalize natural 
resources: in order that these resources return to the Bolivian people.6 
In fact, the promotion of buen vivir is stated as a state responsibility in Article 8 of the 
constitution of Bolivia.
Morales has returned to Tiwanaku many times to renew his mandate and to celebrate 
the ‘Aymara New Year’, the winter solstice on June 21st.This celebration, which dates 
4 ‘[E]l Estado que se va, que muere. Un Estado colonial que permitió el saqueo permanente de los 
recursos naturales de esta noble tierra, un Estado colonial disciplinador, un Estado colonial que 
siempre nos ha visto a los pueblos indígenas del mundo como salvajes, como animales. No sé 
cuánto cambiaremos pero hay que cambiar, porque el Estado colonial no trae ninguna esperanza 
para los pueblos del mundo’ (Translation by author). Full text of public speech available online: http://
www.aporrea.org/internacionales/n72540.html 
5 ‘Los pueblos del mundo de pie, nunca de rodillas frente al capitalismo. Esta es una lucha histórica, 
una lucha milenaria de nuestros antepasados’ (Translation by author). Full text of public speech 
available online: http://www.aporrea.org/internacionales/n72540.html
6 ‘Vivir bien significa vivir en armonía con todo y con todos, entre seres humanos y con nuestra madre 
Tierra, implica por tanto trabajar por la dignidad de todas y todos. Y hoy día es más importante 
todavía saber compartir, saber distribuir la riqueza de manera equitativa. Lo que es del pueblo, es 
para el pueblo. Democratizar la economía, por eso nacionalizamos los recursos naturales para que 
esos recursos económicos vuelvan al pueblo boliviano’ (Translation by author). Full text of public 
speech available online: http://www.aporrea.org/internacionales/n72540.html
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from the late 1980s, has now spread to many communities. Most recently, as the work 
of Anne Ebert (personal communication) has shown, the Morales administration is 
dispatching ministers of state to all department capitals in order to celebrate the solstice, 
the indigenous New Year and so this Andean invented tradition is nationalized and 
celebrated as part of statecraft in departments and provinces far from the mountains 
where it originated. This is not simply an infusion of Andean indigenous rituals into 
state ritual but surely an attempt to create a new national culture based on indigenous 
principles. It is somewhat reminiscent of the nation building movement of many Latin 
American States, starting with Mexico after the Revolution, which attempted to create 
a new national culture based on mestizo people, culture and values. In this case the 
nation is imagined as indigenous. So Morales is fond of quoting the maxim widely 
recognized as Inka in origin: ‘Don’t be lazy, don’t steal, don’t lie’, or that ‘indigenous 
people are the moral reserve of humanity’ (Goodman 2007).
One of the perhaps more bizarre manifestations of this new statecraft is the President’s 
participation in mass marriage ceremonies, most recently in May 2011 (Postero 2011). 
In this ceremony, over 350 couples were married in an ‘ancestral’ and ‘traditional’ 
ceremony in which the President was the sponsor, i.e., the padrino of all the couples 
who hailed from eleven different ethnic groups and included individuals from Cuba and 
Nicaragua. We can leave aside, for the moment, the depth of this tradition but what is 
striking here is that in this ceremony which was intending to ‘being a radical process 
of depatriarchalization of the colonial, liberal and neoliberal family’7 the head of state is 
presenting himself as the indigenous godfather of the nation.
As Postero (2011) points out, the state is creating a ‘tradition’ which does not conform 
to any particular indigenous culture and, in particular its assertion that marriage is 
enacted in a single event, goes against the understandings of the highland cultures 
it is most closely supposed to represent. The central point is not, however, that this 
state, as every other, invents tradition, but rather that it is working on creating a 
national indigenous culture. If much of the politics of indigeneity is about difference 
and recognizing the cultural and other rights of minority groups, Morales’ government 
is asserting a very different vision of indigeneity: a homogeneous national culture for 
the majority. The politics of the 1990s seemed to be about a celebration of diversity 
and the multiplicity of indigenous cultures, to wit the formation of a plurinational and 
multicultural state. Morales seems to be returning to a much older pattern of ethnic 
relations where indians were believed to occupy a structurally distinct position whether 
as the defeated in conquest, a fiscal category, a racial group or a social class. Seen 
7 Quote from Evo Morales (translation by author): see http://www.prensalibre.com/internacional/Evo-
Morales-organiza-parejas-indigenas_0_475752608.html
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from this historical perspective, Morales seems to be trying to create a new kind of 
relationship between indians and the state, one where the indian is privileged rather 
than disadvantaged, to be sure, but nevertheless inherits a long tradition of seeing 
indians as essentially a homogeneous category. They share a political positioning but, 
it seems, also a set of traditions and beliefs.
This discussion of ceremonies and traditions invented or otherwise are largely at the 
level of the expressive and might be regarded as potentially superficial and ephemeral. 
The new national constitution, however, is a different matter. Among other things, 
Article 30 mentions a new political subject the indigenous originary peasant (indígena 
originario campesino): ‘An indigenous originary and peasant nation and people is all 
the human collectivity which shares a cultural identity, language, historical traditions, 
institutions, territoriality and worldview whose existence predates the Spanish colonial 
invasion’ (translation by the author).
I shall leave aside for a moment why the constitution does not simply refer to an 
indigenous nation and people and adds the seemingly redundant ‘originary and peasant’ 
(the nomenclature was subject to heated controversy and debate) but there is clear 
an attempt here outline a new vision of the nation-state and one in which indigenous 
citizens are not simply one of many differentiated groups but have a privileged position 
within it. Not only is the new indigenous originary and peasant person imagined as the 
model citizen but, as we saw above, in indigenous cultures is where the moral foundation 
of the nation-state lies. But what does it mean to talk of indigenous citizenship? 
3. Indigenous Citizenship 
Postero (2007) titled her book about indigenous politics in Bolivia ‘Now We are Citizens’ 
taking the words from Pablo, a Guaraní who was comparing the time when indians were 
treated ‘like animals’ to the present when they enjoy a totally new relation to the nation-
state (Postero 2007: 9). The feelings of Pablo are doubtless reproduced across the 
country. In my own research in highland Bolivia I recall Aymara speaking merchants, 
children of rural peasants, comment that the rural indians ‘did not have citizenship’ 
and, in turn, the rural indians agreed: they felt discriminated against by police and 
judges for being indians and did not even participate in the national Independence Day 
Celebrations deeming these of interest only to q’aras, whites and mestizos. As one 
Aymara-speaking friend told me, ‘That time of the 6th of August was when the whites 
and mestizos made the government of Bolivia appear. Since then the 6th of August 
has existed.’ There is no question that across Bolivia people have been empowered 
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by Morales’ election night cry ‘Now we are all Presidents!’ and what this implied for 
indigenous Bolivians.
In Bolivia, moreover, the language of political indigeneity has been clearly used by 
various groups as an explicit critique of neoliberal globalization (Canessa 2007; 
Maybury-Lewis 2003; Sieder 2002; Cott 2002; Postero and Zamosc 2004; Yashar 
1998), but it has also been used to argue for a new relationship with the nation state 
as well (Postero 2007: 17; Goodale 2009); that is, a new sense of citizenship and 
entitlement. This citizenship, however, is clearly not even distributed in Bolivia. It is 
certainly the case that some groups are able to mobilize in a creative way to form new 
relationships with the state (Gustafson 2003). Most celebrated are the coca growers 
(Grisaffi 2010) who were able to articulate a ‘lite’ (ibid.: 433) version of indigeneity 
which focused on relations with the state rooted in the coca leaf as a metonym for a 
broader set of colonial and postcolonial injustices. Nicole Fabricant’s (2012) work with 
landless peasants in the eastern lowlands offers a comparable analysis of mobilized 
groups who use land as an indigenous trope of political engagement. In these two 
latter cases, these social movements have not only forged new relationships with the 
state but have become very closely allied with the state. Not all groups have such 
privileged access, however, Esther López’ (2012) work among the Tacana in the 
eastern lowlands demonstrates how there is conflict between indigenous groups with 
some highlanders being seen as having privileged access to the state machinery at 
the expense of others. 
The neoliberal reforms of the 1990s introduced the idea of a multi ethnic and plurinational 
Bolivia. What we are seeing today is a rejection of mestizaje as national ideology 
many have commented on the new forms of indigenous citizenship indigenous Latin 
Americans are experiencing today (Kymlicka 1995; Postero 2007; Stavenhagen 2002; 
Yashar 1998), and in sharp contrast to an historical context where being indigenous 
ipso facto implied a lack of citizenship. María Elena García goes further in her analysis 
in proposing an indigenous citizenship where ‘cultural difference is no longer a criterion 
for exclusion, but one of inclusion in a multicultural political community’ (2005: 165). 
The contemporary state in Bolivia has rejected the politics of assimilation in favor of 
a recognition of cultural and ethnic diversity and moved indigenous identity from the 
margins of the nation state to its very heart: the indigenous is now the paradigmatic 
citizen (Canessa 2006).
This has partly come about because in Morales’ Bolivia, political legitimacy rests on 
being indigenous (although this is, of course, contested). On many occasions Morales 
has positioned the indigenous as being the best place from which to defend and 
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protect the nation’s natural resources and to push for social justice on a very wide 
front; indigeneity provides his government with the legitimacy to rule and a platform 
from which to protect the nation against cultural and economic globalization (even as 
he embraces many of its key aspects); in short, indigeneity is the foundation of a new 
nationalism. This nationalism is, however, founded on a double discourse: the Bolivian 
nation is indigenous on the world stage as it presents itself in a struggle against global 
capitalism; internally, however, some people are clearly more indigenous than others. 
In other words, Morales and his government are articulating a very 19th century vision 
of the state where each nation, that is people with a shared history and culture, should 
aspire to their own state, with all the nation-building discourses this implies.
What we are seeing then is something much more than the ‘indigenous citizenship’ 
proposed by María Elena García which is really citizenship for indigenous people. In 
Bolivia today indigenous citizens are not only recognized as citizens of the nation but, 
rather, they have a privileged position vis à vis the state (cf. Postero and Zamosc 2004: 
5-7). Indigenous citizenship in this sense is not simply a new model of citizenship for 
indigenous people but a new model of citizenship per se. Joanne Rappaport (2005) 
has noted that even in Colombia, which has a very small indigenous population, 
indigenous groups have successfully managed to change the definition of citizenship 
in that country, and I would argue that it is even more strongly the case in Bolivia.
The Bolivian constitution thus introduces a new political subject, the indigenous 
originary peasant. It raises the question, however, as to why such a clumsy term was 
used. Why not just use indigenous? The Spanish word indígena has been used for 
centuries in Bolivia but in recent decades, and especially after the 1952 Revolution 
which decreed that all peasant indians would thenceforth be called campesinos, the 
term indígena has largely been used to describe marginal lowland forest dwellers. 
Highlanders, even those living very ‘traditional’ lifestyles did not, until very recently, use 
the word indígena as a self-description. In fact, when I first started conducting fieldwork 
in the Andes in the early 1990s, none of my interlocutors described themselves as 
‘indigenous’ although today, many will, by making explicit reference to the politics of 
the Morales administration. Its contemporary use is confusing: on the one hand it often 
refers to lowland indigenous people, and on the other it refers to a broad set of values 
most clearly associated with and articulated by the Morales administration. 
One of the paradoxes of this contemporary situation is that many highlanders – 
who at least in certain contexts identify as indigenous – will look down on lowland 
indigenous people and even other highlanders as less civilized. Alessandra Pelligrini’s 
(pers. comm.) work among coca growers in the Yungas region, a traditional coca-
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growing area, observes many instances of ambivalence towards indigeneity. For these 
coca-growers, the politics of indigeneity is most closely associated with the governing 
Movement toward Socialism (MAS) party and its policies which clearly favor coca 
growers. There nevertheless remains a residual ambivalence with respect to their 
highland kin as well as lowland neighbours. Pelligrini notes that people in the Yungas 
have pity on their monolingual relatives who are, unlike them, poor; at least, that is 
their perspective. Highlanders do not know how to make money. What is striking for 
her fieldwork is that they use the word jaqi, an Aymara word that means ‘people’ and 
used to distinguish indigenous people from mestizos and whites, in a pejorative sense. 
Something shoddy, poor, or malfunctioning can be described as jaqi, and the cheap 
soft drink that is often all that highlanders can afford is sometimes referred to as jaqi 
cola. 
If the neoliberal reforms changed the way people related to the nation state, that 
is, they transformed the what Deborah Yashar describes as structures that regulate 
access to political membership and definitions of citizenship rights, and as structures of 
intermediation between the state and its citizens, what she identifies as the ‘citizenship 
regime’ (Yashar 2005: 6, 47-48), the recent constitution has changed it once again. 
The new constitution defines thirty-six indigenous nations and languages and explicitly 
aims at establishing indigenous values if not people at the center of the nation-state. 
4. Differentiated Indigenous Citizens
The contemporary Bolivian state explicitly celebrates diversity by recognizing the 
pluricultural nature of the state and in, for example, translating buen vivir in various 
indigenous languages for the constitution. In practice, however, the state is much more 
keen on celebrating highland values than lowland ones. The government’s insistence 
on spreading the Aymara New Year across the country is a good example. On a more 
concrete level is the support or even active encouragement by the state for colonization 
of lowland areas by highlanders.
The collapse of mining in the 1980s began a massive movement of population from 
the highlands to the lowlands. Some of these were to the traditional coca growing 
areas of the yungas, but very large numbers of migrants went to areas such as the 
Chapare region and began cultivating coca leaf. In this period, there were very few 
viable opportunities for poor Aymara and Quechua people from the highlands. The 
Chapare was known as a frontier territory but it was not uninhabited. In the 1950s and 
1960s the residents of Cochabamba lived in fear of these ‘wild indians’ but by the 1980s 
they were being displaced by Aymara and Quechua colonists from the highlands who 
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treated them little differently to the way lowland indians have been treated historically. 
They spoke of them as ‘savages’ who ‘didn’t know how to work’ and their displacement 
or engagement as wage laborers for the colonists was seen as a civilizing mission. The 
colonists, after all, were teaching them the virtues of labor.
It is in the Chapare that Morales has his political base and it is here that his political vision 
was forged. The communities of the Chapare are not the kinds of communities one 
sees in the highlands with a long history of settlement and complex rituals which bind 
people together but, rather, a set of new communities focusing on an economic activity 
which for decades has been subject to military, including US military, intervention. 
Unlike other Aymara and Quechua peasants, the coca growers from this and other 
regions are engaged in cash crop monoculture; they make money. And despite the 
problems with law enforcement, these areas continue to attract temporary or permanent 
migrants in search of cash. For example, in the highland community where I have 
conducted fieldwork, men regularly go to the coca growing areas as seasonal migrants. 
Coca growers are one of several groups of people – landless peasants (Fabricant 
2012), urban people, highland colonists to the lowlands – who originate in ‘traditional’ 
indigenous communities and have an historical consciousness of racism and injustice 
but who nevertheless do not identify closely with the lifeways and cultural values of their 
communities of origin. In times past such economically dynamic people would have 
been on their way to becoming mestizos and accepting the value of dominant mestizo-
creole society. That model of assimilation, however, is largely defunct and what we find 
are large numbers of people who neither see themselves as mestizos or as jaqi or runa, 
the Aymara and Quechua words for people who follow a particular traditional lifestyle. 
In urban areas people are developing an ‘indigenous cosmopolitanism’ (Goodale 
2006) or, as described in a recent paper by Jill Wightman (2011), the new rising middle 
classes are increasingly less likely to identify as mestizo but will choose to identify 
as indigenous or chola even if their lifestyles would seem to be more consonant with 
urban middle classes. So Wightman gives an example of a young professional woman, 
a university educated lawyer, who identifies herself as ‘of the chola class’.
Urban people, coca growers, and highland colonists to the lowlands form a majority 
of those people identified as indigenous in the 2001 census (INE 2002). 51% of those 
identified as indigenous lived in urban areas (the census asked for identification with 
an originary people (pueblo originario or indigenous). In fact, is quite possible that 
such people constitute an absolute majority of the Bolivian population. It should not 
be surprising then that the dominant mode of indigeneity in Bolivia today is one that 
      desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series, No. 22, 2012 | 21
speaks to a dynamic population engaged in market activities seeking economic growth, 
rather than one which seeks to sacrifice economic growth in favor of buen vivir.
There is a tension, however, in the constitutional insistence that indigenous people 
have control over their recognized territories, and may choose to refuse exploitation on 
their lands, and the perceived need for economic growth based on extractive industries 
and intensive agriculture. One of the clearest political problems facing the government 
is not that there is oil exploitation in the lowlands, but that there is oil exploitation in 
the lowlands in areas of greatest political opposition to the government. Their defense 
of indigenous communities’ rights to resist oil exploitation changes when the oil in 
question is in departments such as La Paz which although considered a highland 
department has large tracts of land in the lowlands.
5. The Mosetén Case
On the 29th of December 2009, in La Paz, the Minister of Hydrocarbons and Energy of 
Morales’ government, Oscar Coca Antezana, signed a resolution8 rejecting a petition 
against an oil exploration project,9 made by various leaders from various indigenous 
organizations.10 
This seemed to be in direct contradiction of the new constitution which explicitly 
recognizes indigenous peoples’ rights to be consulted and reject the exploitation 
of resources on their territories. The Vice President, Alvaro García, explained the 
government’s surprising position in an interview with Pablo Stefanoni in Le Monde 
Diplomatique:
When we consulted with CPILAP (Central de Pueblos Indígenas de La Paz), 
they asked us to go and negotiate in Brussels with their law firm and that we 
respect certain announcements on the environment issued by USAID/ How 
can this be? Who is preventing the state from exploring for oil in the north of 
[the Department of] La Paz: the Tacana indigenous communities, an NGO, or 
foreign countries? We have gone to negotiate from community to community 
and there we have found the support of the communities to go ahead with the 
exploration and exploitation of oil. […] The indigenous popular government has 
consolidated the long struggle of the people for land and territory. In the case 
8 Resolución proceso de consulta y participación. Res. 001/2009
9 Exploración sísmica 2d bloque Lliquimuni fase 2
10 Pueblos Indígenas del Departamento de La Paz (CPILAP), Pueblos Indígenas Lecos y Comunidades 
Originarias de Larecaja (PILCOL) and the Organización del Pueblo Indígena Mosetén (OPIM).
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of the minority indigenous people of the lowlands, the state has consolidated 
millions of hectares of historic territory for many groups with low population 
density, but alongside the right to land of a people is the right of the state, of 
the state, of the state led by the indigenous-popular and peasant movement, to 
impose the greater collective interest of all the people. And that is how we are 
going to proceed. (Le Monde Diplomatique September 11, 2009)
Here the government ignored the recognized representatives of the indigenous 
communities and, in effect, went in search of people who would support the oil 
exploration, community to community, one by one, offering schools, community 
buildings, health posts, most of which have yet to materialize. 
The key issue, however, is not the state’s lack of fulfillment of its promises, but firstly that 
it follows in a long tradition of discounting indigenous people’s voices on the grounds 
that they are manipulated by NGOs, and secondly that it subordinates indigenous 
people’s interests to that of the state, a state led by an ‘indigenous-popular and peasant 
movement’. The state, in the eyes of the Vice-President, represents and articulates 
the ‘collective interest of all the people’ but this state has legitimacy because of its 
indigenous credentials. Morales successfully articulated a set of issues and interests 
such as gas and justice as indigenous ones, which got him elected on a broad platform, 
but he has then moved to subordinate all indigenous interests to that of the state. His 
performance of state ritual in archaeological sites and apparently innocuous events 
such as mass marriages are actually important in his construction of a state based on 
indigenous legitimacy but which, paradoxically, subordinates indigenous interests. And 
so, in his own words: ‘Amazonia without oil’ is a slogan for foreign interests’.
Morales continues in that interview: 
The right uses some of our brothers to oppose us to suggest things which are so 
fundamental as to be non-negotiable: how is it possible that all the state lands 
and national parks be in the hands of some indigenous brothers; that all the 
logging concessions, once recovered, fall into the hands of the small groups of 
the Bolivian indigenous movement. I feel it is a form of opposition to the policies 
we are developing (translation by author). (Cambio, 25 June 2010)
Morales here is echoing some of the themes that his Vice-President discussed. The 
interests of the (indigenous) state cannot be sacrificed to the interests of small groups 
of marginal people with large tracts of land despite having just established such a right 
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in the constitution. Among lowlanders, there is consequently considerable opposition 
to the indigenous president who is seen as favoring highlanders against them.
This leads us to a fundamental contradiction in Bolivia’s politics of indigeneity (cf. 
Postero 2012): 
(1)    The Morales Government makes an explicit commitment to alternative models of 
         development, whereby ‘living well’ is prioritized over economic growth.
(2)    The Morales Government is committed to a program of economic growth based 
      on the exploitation of natural resources such as oil, gas and lithium and the 
         expansion of coca. 
The first point addresses the concerns of small indigenous groups who need protection 
from agribusinesses and extractive industries. The second is for a development of 
these industries in favor of the small capitalist farmers and the urban poor. On the one 
hand the rhetoric of buen vivir plays well to certain international audiences and in, for 
example, lobbying the UN to change Earth Day to Mother Earth Day. Another example 
is his address to the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in 
2009 where he said:
We are here because in Copenhagen, the so-called developed countries failed 
in their obligation to provide substantial commitments to reduce greenhouse 
gases. We have two paths: either Pachamama or death. Either capitalism lives 
or Mother Earth lives. Of course, brothers and sisters, we are here for life, for 
humanity, and for the rights of Mother Earth. Long live the rights of Mother 
Earth! Death to capitalism! (Democracy Now 4/21/10 in Postero 2012).
The ‘Pachamama or death’ slogan has been often repeated by Morales but not that 
often in Bolivia itself in front of Bolivian audiences. Whereas in August of 2009, the 
United Nations General Assembly declared Morales a ‘World Hero of Mother Earth’ 
(Fromherz 2011) and he is widely feted internationally as the indigenous ecowarrior par 
excellence, in Bolivia itself he is following a policy of economic growth which includes 
exploiting lithium in the highlands and hydrocarbons and monoculture in the lowlands 
with scant regard for environmental damage (Farthing 2009; Postero 2012). The issue 
is not so much whether or even what kind of economic development there should be 
but, rather, who should control it, as well as how the resources and revenues will be 
distributed.
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6. Indigenous Colonists
The globalized concept explicitly presents indigenous people as being subjects 
of colonization and many scholars have argued for a productive engagement with 
concepts of indigeneity precisely because it is a means through which relatively 
powerless people can make justice claims. Indeed, as I have argued (2008), a claim 
to indigeneity is first and foremost a claim to justice. Justice and powerlessness are, 
however, relative concepts and there is a danger is assuming that indigenous people 
are always and everywhere in the right. Béteille (1998: 90) warns us of this when he 
asks: ‘Is there now such an essentialist view of indigenous people in which they carry 
their identity with them wherever they go and whatever they do?’ How does such a 
rhetorical question shed light on the situation in Bolivia? The first issue to consider 
is whether an indigenous identity travels and surely it must: if the state is going to 
recognize indigenous citizens it must surely do so whether they live in the jungle or in 
the suburbs in the same way it recognizes other minorities; and surely one is indigenous 
whatever one does. 
The history of Bolivia can easily be described as the history of the oppression of 
the descendants of pre-European populations in the service of white-dominated 
agribusiness and mining. There can be surely no issue in celebrating the taking of 
power from the white elite by a government which represents the indigenous majority. 
The problem arises, however, when the concept of indigeneity obscures internal 
differentiation and, to take a specific Bolivian point, when highland peasants arrive as 
indigenous citizens to occupy land that is unused or underused in the relatively sparsely 
populated eastern lowlands. Unused, that is, from the perspective of the colonists; not 
exactly unused from the perspective of the equally indigenous people who live there. 
That is, it is not enough to assert that ‘indigenous people are better understood as 
those who are discriminated against; they are rarely the ones discriminating against 
others’ (Kenrick and Lewis 2004) because it leaves us with no critical perspective to 
understand when indigenous people do discriminate against others.
In a recent trip to the lowland town of Rurrenabaque, I spoke to many Aymara and 
Quechua migrants who arrived mostly since the opening of the road to La Paz in the 
1980s which opened the area up for settlement. Today, Rurrenabaque is dominated by 
Aymara and Quechua shopkeepers.
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Aymara shopkeeper Rubén told me what it was like: 
I have been here for twenty years. When I first came there was nothing, nothing: 
just one road and no electricity. It was quiet then, simple, you know. Now it is 
busy; I liked it more then… These people, you know, didn’t know how to do 
anything. We [the migrants] have made Rurrenabaque what it is today. The 
people here don’t know how to work, we have civilized this place. (translated 
from Aymara by the author) 
The idea that Aymara and Quechua migrants civilize the lowlands is a fairly consistent 
theme across the region.
Another trader, Marcelino, gave me another, fairly typical account but adds an important 
gender element:  
Oh yes, I have a wife. She is in Santa Cruz but I also have a wife here, a young 
girl. She is 22 (Marcelino is 45). I have a child with her. The people here are 
very simple. Before I came twenty years ago there was nothing here. We have 
brought civilization. They don’t understand. In those days they would just give 
you a woman for twenty pesos. (Laughter) It is very easy to take a woman here. 
(translated from Aymara by the author) 
The juxtaposition of colonization and the taking of indigenous women is not coincidental; 
is has been, in fact, both an image and practice of conquest since the arrival of the 
Spanish (Canessa 2012a). The difference here is that it is an Aymara who is invoking 
this kind of relationship, inserting himself into a colonial relationship as colonizer 
rather than colonized. As we will see below, the President himself is by no means 
immune from this kind of language. It is not, however, simply a matter of language 
since marrying into an indigenous community will give access to land rights as well. 
Whereas in the past having a non-indigenous father gave certain advantages, now 
the opposite is often the case, since it is through the indian mother that one can gain 
access to territorial rights. In many cases, the same people remain in power (López 
2012), but instead of legitimizing their positions through their fathers or grandfathers, 
they do so through their mothers.
Despite state recognition of indigenous land titles, new migrants use their indigeneity 
to colonize on the grounds that they too are indigenous (López 2012) and the state 
recognition of an indigenous territory arguably increases exposure to colonists rather 
than protecting locals from them. 
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The argument of being indigenous as well, and thus having a right to settling in 
whichever indigenous territory they choose, highlights the missing mechanism and yet 
necessity for a legal or even conceptual distinction between indigenous groups. This 
example also demonstrates how certain indigenous groups are perceived – whether 
by themselves or by others – to have more legitimacy and power than other groups. 
Thus, in overlooking fundamental differences between indigenous groups, the state is 
not only failing to recognize the hierarchy of power between indigenous cultures but 
is actually exacerbating it: ‘Recognition by power can, and increasingly does, involve 
as many problems as the neglect and marginalization that comes from an absence of 
state interest’ (Dombrowski 2002: 1071).
It also points to a scalar issue when considering indigenous issues and identity. Clearly, 
in some contexts, highlanders are adopting the view that they are indigenous wherever 
they may be in the country and they, as indigenous people, have the right to occupy 
and cultivate land when they consider it unoccupied. The idea that lowland indigenous 
people are sitting on vast tracts of unproductive land is shared by the President 
and colonos alike and both show little patience for the views of lowlanders. This is 
compounded by globalized definitions of indigeneity which define indigenous people 
principally in terms of the nation state. If, for example, one can recognize an indigenous 
person living in a city, and few would want to argue that there is no such thing, then 
why not recognize the same person as indigenous in any part of the country? This 
quandary points to a conceptual deficit in distinguishing between indigenous people 
within the nation state.
7. The TIPNIS11 Case 
In May 2010, a meeting uniting community-level leaders from throughout the territory, 
as well as the various Sub-centrals and other organizations, issued a joint declaration 
stating against the building of a road through the territory: 
[O]pening this highway would present a threat to our life as peoples who inhabit 
TIPNIS due to the loss of the natural resources and all the biodiversity upon 
which the Moxeños, Yuracarés, and Chimanes sustain their culture and life: 
a life and culture we have lived in our territory since before the creation of the 
Bolivia and will continue to live in the future.
11 Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Securé, Indigenous National Territory and Park, Isiburo 
Sécure.
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Citing this and other reasons, the meeting voted to:
[O]verwhelmingly and non-negotiably reject the construction of the Villa Tunari 
– San Ignacio de Moxos highway and of any highway segment that would affect 
our territory.12 
The road is part of a continent-wide infrastructural investment by Brazil which is 
providing almost all of the funding for the road. From a more local perspective, the 
road is important because it connects the Chapare, the coca growing area, with Brazil, 
without having to go through Santa Cruz, which is the prime locus of opposition to 
Morales. The road through TIPNIS will also open the area for further colonization by 
coca growers from the Chapare. This colonization is illegal, but the state is already 
unable or unwilling to stop it. There is no question that local people understand that 
intensive colonization will be the first major consequence of the road. It is not surprising, 
then, that the coca growers are fully in support, and so Morales declared on June 30: 
‘Like it or not, we are going to build this road.’ (Los Tiempos 2011a) 
The representatives of TIPNIS argued, citing the constitution, that the road could not 
be built against their wishes but Morales argued in October: 
They want the consultation to be binding. That’s impossible; it’s nonnegotiable. 
The constitution and international law mandate previous consultation, and we 
will always respect that, but letting a group of families tell us what to do would 
mean paralyzing all our work on electrification, hydrocarbons and industries. 
(Los Tiempos 2011b, translation by the author)
As a way of getting out of the problem of the bad publicity, he suggested a wider 
consultation, including people from outside TIPNIS such as the Chapare. For Morales’ 
part he appeared to think he had consulted with indigenous people, just not those 
living in TIPNIS. His government, in any case, represented the majority of indigenous 
people in the country and it appears that his political miscalculation (he eventually 
had to announce that the road would not be built) rests on his confusion of the place 
indigenous citizens have in the state he leads and the constitutional right of small 
groups to resist the state even though legitimized by the support of an indigenous 
majority.
12 Translation by author. Full text available online: http://somossur.net/documentos/TIPNIS_ResXXX_
EncuentroCorregidores20120318.pdf
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What is interesting, too, is that in August of this year he echoed the vision of colonization 
expressed by Marcelino in Rurrenabaque when he was reported as asking the residents 
of the Chapare to convince the indigenous people of TIPNIS to give the green light to 
the construction:
You, compañeras and compañeros, need to explain, to guide the indigenous 
compañeros. Their own mayor is moving to convince them not to oppose [the 
road], he [Evo Morales] said. Later he added: If I had time I would go and 
woo the Yuracaré compañeras and convince them not to oppose. That is, 
young men, you have instructions from the President to seduce [conquistar] 
the Yuracaré women so that they won’t oppose the building of the road. He 
immediately asked: All in favor? and applause was heard from the assembled. 
(La Razón 2011, translation by the author)
8. Conclusions
Indigeneity always implies a relationship with the state (cf. Aparicio and Blaser 2008; 
Dombrowksi 2002; Li 2000; Urban and Scherzer 1991; Shah 2010). It is not simply that 
international law and convention explicitly frames indigenous peoples as being subjects 
of an independent state, but that indigenous rights claims are almost always against 
states and pursued through national rather than international courts. If we eschew 
essentialist notions of indigeneity and see it as principally a rights discourse based on 
a particular relationship to space and time and an historical sense of injustice, then it is 
clear that it is a relationship with a state that defines indigeneity.
In a recent book, Alpa Shah (2010) makes this very argument and notes that even in the 
indigenous state of Jharkand in India, the people most easily identified as indigenous 
are the ones least likely to benefit from the indigenous state. I would make the very same 
argument for Bolivia and there are striking similarities between these two indigenous 
states. This should not, however, surprise us: once an indigenous discourse is broad 
enough to include a majority of people, it is surely inevitable that some groups will have 
more access to indigenous capital than others. This may occur even in situations when 
the majority of the population is not identified as indigenous but nevertheless where 
the state is founded on a basic sense of autochthony. In a recent article, Paula López 
Caballero (2011) notes how peasants in central Mexico use discourses of indigeneity, 
authenticity, and primacy to create legitimacy and exclude others, including indigenous 
people from other parts of Mexico. 
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The problem then arises in how we distinguish between different rights claims. In 
a recent book and series of articles Peter Geschiere and colleagues (Geschiere 
and Nyamnjoh 2000; Geschiere 2009; Gausset 2008) have proposed a conceptual 
distinction between autochthony and indigeneity. His inspiration was the similarity 
between discourses of autochthony in West Africa and the Netherlands and Belgium. 
In many ways it is entirely inappropriate for discussing the Bolivian case because 
Latin Americans very rarely use the word; but the conceptual distinctions Geschiere 
and others make may still be useful in understanding the conflict in Bolivia today. In 
Geschiere’s schema, both autochthony and indigeneity are discourses of belonging 
but with important differences. Autochthons are settled, often in the majority and make 
claims on the state against those made by others, these others being settlers or, we 
might add, other minority groups. Indigenous people are best understood in terms 
of their marginality, often unsettled, who make a very different set of claims against 
the state which is about preserving claims to land and asserting a cultural difference. 
Quentin Gausset et al. (2011: 139) summarize the distinction thus: indigenous people 
are marginalized whereas autochthons are dominant but fear marginalization.
In their recent summary of these debates, Gausset et al. (2011) pose the question 
as to whether autochthony and indigeneity are ‘false twins’. This question in their title 
remains rhetorical and is never answered. There are two problems with opposing 
autochthony and indigeneity in this way: the first is that the terms are too vague and 
unstable; in any case, the term is almost never used in Spanish or Anglophone America; 
the second problem is that the argument presupposes that there are some people 
who are autochthons and other who are not; that is, that they can be distinguished in 
a systematic way. What is clear is that Morales and his government are articulating 
views more resonant with autochthony movements in Europe and Africa than those 
of marginalized indigenous groups struggling against the state. This accounts for the 
otherwise bizarre fact that Morales has his admirers among groups such as German 
neo-Nazis.13
8.1 The Discourse of Indigeneity in Bolivia
Rather than get bogged down in a sterile debate, I suggest that it is more important to 
make distinctions between different claims of belonging and different claims against 
the state. The claims of coca growers, landless peasants, and some urban groups 
are similar to some of the autochthonous discourses described by scholars, but these 
people are clearly both subaltern as well as in the majority. These are, perhaps, the 
13 See:_http://www.npd-hamburg.de/aktuelles/nachrichten/evo-morales-ein-nationaler-sozialist- 
boliviens-29092010_1041.html. I am grateful to Sergio Costa for drawing my attention to this.
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originary peasant peoples mentioned in the constitution. If we disaggregate them 
from the ‘indigenous’, however, we see a very different set of rights claims. Coca 
growers and urbanites see themselves as excluded parts of the nation and want their 
rights protected from global capitalism, large scale landowners, and a mestizo creole 
elite which has long dominated Bolivia’s political and economic life. Their discourse 
may be anti-capitalist on one hand in the sense of being against large multinational 
corporations but clearly seeks economic growth in capitalist markets; they simply want 
better access to these markets. In the case of coca growers, they seek the legalization 
of market. In this context, opening up new areas for coca growing or destroying the 
highlands plains for the extraction of lithium makes perfect sense; it is about creating 
wealth and distributing resources to a majority group who have been largely excluded 
from power and do not want to join the mestizo middle class, although they clearly do 
want to increase their consumption. 
This discourse of indigeneity is founded on a particular critique of globalization and more 
specifically global corporations and the United States. The discourse of indigeneity 
rooted in symbols rather than community life or ritual practices lends itself well to a 
discourse that can manipulate symbols such as the coca leaf or the Pachamama 
without necessarily rooting these into a particular way of life. These originary peasants 
are seeking a relationship with the state which favors them as iconic citizens. From 
the government’s point of view, they are seeking to articulate an ecumenical sense of 
indigeneity that applies to a majority of citizens if not exactly all of them. It is hard to 
see such people as being dominant within the nation-state but their discourse does 
conform very much to what Geschiere and others say about autochthony, in that they 
seek to distinguish between citizens and the basis of different criteria of belonging. It 
is for these reasons that Morales goes to such efforts to nationalize the Aymara New 
Year and develop a set of indigenous symbols with the widest possible appeal. If, in the 
twentieth century, the state tried to create a national culture based on mestizaje, the 
Morales government is seeking in the twenty-first century to create a national culture 
based on indigenous culture. Paradoxically, this national indigenous culture holds a 
very strong potential of excluding marginal indigenous groups.
The dream articulated by Morales is one of a Bolivia for the kinds of people we might 
call autochthonous: urban people, coca growers, small peasant farmers, who are 
suffering from poverty at the hands of large enterprises in the hands of a predominantly 
white economic elite. Oil production in departments not controlled by the eastern white 
elite, the expansion of coca growing into the eastern lowlands, a road that bypasses 
Santa Cruz, the economic and political capital of the east: all are ways in which the 
state furthers the interests of the small farmer, the urban migrant: people often who 
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were born in marginal communities on the fringes of the capitalist economy but who 
now see themselves on a path to economic advancement. People who, incidentally, do 
not like being called indigenous, and who clearly look down on people they describe as 
indigenous, and not just lowlanders. They are happy with certain symbols of indigeneity, 
their originary status which gives them land and other economic rights, a discourse 
on the coca leaf as an indigenous symbol but most certainly not an embrace of rural 
highland people who are poor and marginalized or lowlanders who occupy large tracts 
of land and do ‘not know how to use it’.
Much of the recent debate in Bolivia has divided the country into highlands dominated by 
Aymara and Quechua peasants, the ‘natural’ supporters of Morales, and the lowlands 
dominated by a white landowning class and including a large number of small, diverse, 
and marginalized indigenous people. National political divisions often run along these 
lines but such a schema obscures important differences. There are many highland 
groups who are excluded from national indigeneity in similar ways to lowland peasants. 
One of the most striking examples is that of the people of Jesus de Machaca where I 
have been conducting fieldwork since 2008. The people of this area have a long history 
of resistance to the state – historically dominated by mestizo and creole elites – and 
they played a significant role in the many blockades and mobilizations that ultimately 
culminated in the election of the first indigenous president of the country. Even here, 
people struggle with what we might call national indigeneity in their attempts to maintain 
their political autonomy (Orta 2013; Canessa 2012b; Cameron 2010). Despite passing 
a law on Indigenous Autonomy in 2009, the government put enormous pressure on the 
people of the municipality to reject a referendum seeking recognition as an Indigenous 
Autonomous Community on the grounds that the state was already indigenous and 
such an act would merely risk division between the state and its natural allies. No 
lesser person than the Vice-President weighed in with his comments on this issue. The 
referendum narrowly passed but people continue to be wary and worried at what they 
see as government bullying.
Other highland communities, such as that of Pocobaya where I have conducted 
fieldwork since 1989, also exhibit a certain ambivalence towards the new indigenous 
state. Although enthusiastic supporters of the Morales government, they are bemused 
by some of the elements of statecraft. It is these people, many of them mestizos, who 
are best positioned to invoke the abstract symbolization of earth deities and indigeneity 
in the broad ecumenical sense and are most able to extract resources from the state. 
I was very surprised recently to hear a mestizo peasant from a community well known 
for its historical antipathy towards indians describe himself to me as an Aymara and the 
enthusiasm of creoles and mestizos for celebrating the Aymara New Year. The Aymara 
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peasants surrounding the town of Sorata, who do not celebrate the Aymara New Year, 
are puzzled by some of the descriptions of the Pachamama as the national symbol of 
struggle for natural resources and are perplexed when a national politician described 
natural gas as her fart (Felipe Quispe, interview with author). It cannot be assumed 
that even in the highlands those who are most rooted in traditional rural lifeways will be 
the most comfortable with national indigeneity; in fact, it speaks most clearly to a very 
different constituency. 
There is no doubt, however, that such dissonance is most clearly heard among lowland 
indigenous people. They, too, have a discourse of belonging but may find themselves 
pitted against the state which is seeking resources for the majority. In fact, the President 
and ministers may show open irritation at the potential for small indigenous groups 
to frustrate the states plans for economic growth and development. This frustration 
echoes many of the concerns of ‘autochtonous’ groups in Europe and Africa who are 
concerned about the ‘special rights’ of minority groups whom they see as impeding 
national development and prejudicing the rights of the majority. These minority groups 
are also negotiating a relationship with the state but are principally seeking protection 
from the state rather than to co-opt the state for their own ends, as is arguably the case 
for coca growers. They are also seeking protection from highland colonists who, even 
as they might sometimes describe themselves as indigenous, have little patience for 
the lifestyle of forest dwellers they see as idle and unproductive.
8.2 Implications of Bolivia for Theorizing Indigeneity
International law and multilateral agencies in defining indigeneity in terms of nation 
states have a very weak conceptual framework at best to comprehend inter-indigenous 
conflict that I have been describing. As ever more people are identifying as indigenous 
and indigeneity becomes increasingly used to articulate a wide range of claims for 
justice we need more sophisticated concepts the better to distinguish between these 
claims. The distinction between autochthony and indigeneity cannot sustain a critical 
analysis in this context but it does point to a first step in making distinctions between 
them although I do think a distinction between autochthons and indigenes is a dead 
end. It is, moreover, not enough to recognize the plurality of indigenous cultures; we 
need to explore more systematically the kinds of relationships indigenous discourses 
demand of the state. The Bolivian case points to a number of interesting tensions and 
contradictions which occur when indigeneity shifts from being a language of opposition 
to the language of governance; from when it moves from articulating the discourses of 
vulnerable minorities to those of national majorities.
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Discourses of indigeneity have as much potential to create hierarchy as to dismantle 
it and the empowerment of some indigenous people may entail the disempowerment 
of others. The paradox of why lowland and other indigenous people are often opposed 
to the government of the first indigenous president and why he appears to have such 
little patience for lowlanders in particular can be immediately resolved be exploring 
the diversity of indigenous voices and the different claims they are making against 
the state. In Bolivia today there are broadly speaking two indigenous discourses: one 
sees indigenous peoples and values as the foundation of the nation state and seeks to 
create and ecumenical indigeneity for a majority of Bolivia’s citizens; the other seeks 
to respect cultural difference in its multiple forms and protection of marginal peoples 
from the state. They are sometimes both articulated by the current government so it is 
not surprising that contradictory positions are taken since, at root, the two discourses 
are fundamentally opposed.
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